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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
court judgment was the lifting of the nationwide injunction against
Coming. 7 The court found that such a large scale injunction was
unjustified since Corning had made some sincere efforts to comply
with the Equal Pay Act, and because there was no evidence that
Coming maintained a company-wide policy of sex discrimination.
The court's holding that time of day is not a working condition
which might make jobs unequal gives added impetus to the Act's
effectiveness. It appears that the beneficial purpose of the Act will not
be frustrated by applying the words of the statute in an overly tech-
nical manner. The Second Circuit squarely faced the time of day
question and answered it in a way that will help other courts apply
the Act's provisions to more subtle types of wage discrimination based
on sex. Therefore, it is hoped that the Supreme Court will affirm the
Second Circuit.
However, at least one problem remains unsolved. Corning's pay
scheme was the result of agreements with a union, and not a unilateral
act. The district court denied Corning's motion to join the union as a
party defendant and the Second Circuit did not address this point. In
order to fully implement the spirit of the Equal Pay Act, the courts
should extend liability to unions as the Act would allow8 since pay
scales found in violation of the Act may often be the product of
collective bargaining.
TRUTH-IN-LENDING - DiscLosuE OF SECURITY INTERESTS
N. C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors
Section 125(a) of the Truth-in-Lending Act' gives the consumer
the unqualified right to rescind a credit transaction within three
business days if "a security interest is retained or acquired in any real
property which is used or is expected to be used as the [consumer's]
residence .... " 2 Having been authorized to prescribe rules for imple-
menting the act,3 the Federal Reserve Board expanded the statutory
violate the equal-pay requirements; the temporary nature of the reassignment
becomes questionable under government enforcement policy after one month,
37 474 F.2d at 236.
38 See note 13 supra.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. 1972). The Truth-in-Lending Act constitutes Title I
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.
2 Id. § 1685(a) (emphasis added):
IThe obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the
third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery
of the disclosures required under this section [including disclosure of the right to
rescind without liability], whichever is later ....
3 Id. § 1604.
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language to include a credit transaction in which a security interest
"is or will be retained or acquired." 4 By virtue of this extension, the
disclosure requirements of the Act apply not only to consensual second
mortgages given by the consumer5 but also to security interests which
may arise in favor of the creditor or third parties by operation of law.6
Thus, if credit is extended, the regulation requires the contractor-
creditor to disclose to his customer the possibility of potential liens and
the resultant three-day rescission right.7
Since the typical home improvement contract8 generates a variety
of such liens, two home improvement corporations challenged the
Board's implementation of the regulation. The district court ruled
that the regulation was "null and void,. . . and not within the scope
of Section 125(a) ... insofar as it relates to liens which may come into
existence by operation of law . . ." Moreover, the Federal Trade
Commission was enjoined from enforcing the regulation. Relying
upon fragmentary statements of legislative purpose' ° and the rule that
4 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1973) (emphasis added).
5 Purchase money first mortgages to finance the initial construction on a home are
excluded from the right of rescission. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(g)(1) (1973).
6 Under the Board's application of the Act,
"[s]ecurity interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mort-
gages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not
recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's
liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for
the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and any
interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1973).
7 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b) (1973). Other disclosures required by the Act include finance
charges and annual percentage rates. 15 U.S.C. §9 1605-06 (Supp. 1972). See Bowmar, Truth-
in-Lending: A Look at Some Real Estate Ramifications, 34 ALBANY L. Rav. 231, 233-39
(1970).
8 In the typical home improvement transaction, a contractor agrees to renovate the
customer's residence on credit terms. Although the homeowner executes no mortgage or
other security interest, both the contractor and his subcontractors may be entitled to
statutory liens. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3 (McKinney 1966). The homeowner's failure to
pay the contractor could result in foreclosure on the premises. If the contractor, on the
other hand, does not pay his workers and suppliers, the consumer may be forced to pay
twice for the same work in order to avoid foreclosure by the subcontractors. See generally
Note, Mechanics' Liens and Surely Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Mechanics' Liens]. For an analysis of various types of home improve-
ment credit transactions see Comment, The Right of Rescission and the Home Improve-
ment Industry, 37 ALBANY L. RaV. 247, 262-66 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Right of
Rescission].
9 N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, Civil No. 1970-43 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1971).
According to the provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act, the Federal Reserve Board is
empowered to "prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter." 15
U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is charged with the enforce-
ment of most of the requirements of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970). Because of this
distinction in roles, the injunction was directed at the FTC, the enforcing agency.
10 See note 15 infra.
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remedial statutes should be broadly construed," the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in N. C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors'2 reversed
the district court's decision. For the sake of "uniformity among the
states" and to effectuate the Act's purpose of assuring "meaningful
disclosure of credit terms," the Second Circuit held that potential
statutory lines are security interests within the meaning of the Act.' 3
In upholding the Board's construction of section 125(a), the court
reasoned that, "Congress intended to establish a national policy of
protecting consumers whose residences are jeopardized by operation
of all types of security interests acquired by creditors in the home
improvement industry .... -14
Clearly, the disclosure requirements and right of rescission ex-
pressed in section 125(a) manifest a congressional concern with the
mortgage and potential foreclosure features of credit transactions.' 5
If the consumer is to be fully informed of the consequences of con-
tracts in which security interests are given voluntarily, it follows a
fortiori that the same information should be disclosed when liens may
arise non-voluntarily. Unfortunately, Congress did not word the stat-
ute to meet the latter contingency. The statute speaks only of the
security interest which "is retained or acquired" in the credit trans-
action."' While in a few states' 7 a mechanic's lien arises by operation
11 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) ("remedial statutes should be liberally
construed'); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("remedial legislation should
be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes"). See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
16 (1964).
12473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973)
(No. 72-1601).
13 Id. at 1216.
14 Id.
15 Mhe homeowner is hurried and rushed through the [credit] transaction by glib
and reassuring talk and in many cases he is never informed nor aware that his
home is being made subject to a mortgage ....
One amendment [to the Act] would require that there be disclosure that a mort-
gage is being placed on the borrower's home and that the consequences of such a
mortgage can be explained.
114 CoNG. REc. 1611 (1968) (remarks of Representative Cahill, author of the mortgage dis-
closure requirements of section 125(a)) [hereinafter cited as Remarks of Representative
Cahill].
Representative Sullivan commented:
The Cahill amendment, or rather a series of amendments in the House..
strike[s] at home improvement racketeers who trick homeowners, particularly the
poor, into signing contracts at exorbitant rates, which turn out to be liens on the
family residences. Any credit transaction which involves a security interest in
property must be clearly explained to the consumer as involving a mortgage or
lien ....
114 CoNo. REC. 14,388 (1968). See H.R. Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1968).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (Supp. 1972).
17 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 1 (Supp. 1973) (mechanic's lien attaches as of the
date of contract); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3251 (Supp. 1973).
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of law at the time a construction agreement is made in the majority of
states,18 such a lien does not become effective until either materials
and supplies are delivered, actual work is begun, or the lien is filed
in a recording office. The Second Circuit, nevertheless, seized upon
this lack of uniformity as a basis for confirming the regulation. Judge
Moore refused to accept appellees' argument that Congress thought
of providing the right of rescission only in those instances in which
liens arise at the moment of contracting:
. . . [T]he goal [of the Act] was to provide uniform protection
throughout the nation, irrespective of the vagaries among the states'
lien laws .... [C]onsumers can be effectively protected only if all
statutory liens are included within the regulatory ambit of that
Section.19
A literal reading of section 125(a), the court ruled, would be "too
technical and narrow" and would "eviscerate" the statute.20
18 See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF rFAL PROPERTY 1 484, at 724-28 (1970). Those states
embracing the majority view fall into one of three categories:
(1) Lien attaches when work commences on building. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
(2) Lien attaches when notice is filed. Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
(3) Lien attaches when labor or supplies are actually furnished. Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Utah, and West
Virginia. Mechanics' Lien, supra note 8, at 152 n.69, See, e.g., N.Y. LiEN LAw § 13
(McKinney 1966); VA. CouE ANN. § 43-3 (1970).
Relying upon Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866), the Freed
panel concluded that statutory liens may arise at the time a credit transaction is con-
summated. 473 F.2d at 1215. The principle that a contract is deemed to include all
statutory rights in existence at its inception is well supported. See Northern Pacific Ry.
v. Wall, 241 U.S. 87, 91 (1916); United States v. Essley, 284 F.2d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1960);
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887
(1948). In addition, the Supreme Court, in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380
(1947), held that statutory regulations are incorporated into contracts between private and
public parties. See also Federal Housing Admin. v, Morris Plan Co., 211 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.
1954); A. Gomin, CoNm.&ers § 551, at 197-98 (1960).
19 473 F.2d at 1216.
20 Id. at 1217. The court, citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 US. 332 (1967), adopted the
position that the Truth-in-Lending Act, being a remedial statute, should be construed
liberally in order that its remedial purpose be achieved. 473 F.2d at 1214.
In so construing the statute, the court suggested the application of an "economic
reality" approach to the definition of the term "security interest" in the statute. This test
was derived from cases interpreting certain terms undefined by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1970), or the legislative history of that act. The
Supreme Court, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), indicated that the term
"investment contract" had been construed by courts along broad lines to effectuate the
protective mandate of the state "blue sky" statutes. In so doing, the Court stated, "Form
was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality." Id. at 298.
Cf. SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 US. 622
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Freed is not the first decision sanctioning the Federal Reserve
Board's, alteration of verb tense in section 125(a). In Gardner &i North
Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors,21 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress intended to
protect consumers from all the "inherent consequences" and "hidden
traps" of a home improvement contract.22 The Board's regulation,
therefore, "is entirely consistent with the legislative purpose and is a
proper device for carrying it out. '2 By sustaining the regulation pro-
mulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, the Gardner and Freed courts
have stretched the language of section 125(a) to conform to the puta-
tive purpose of Congress.
In summary, the Second Circuit's ruling requires full compliance
by home improvement contractors with the Federal Reserve Board's
directive. After being warned of potential liens, the consumer has a
three-day "cooling-off" period in which to consider the ramifications
of the transaction.24 If the consumer chooses to rescind, all security
interests inherent in the transaction are nullified, and any considera-
tion exchanged between the parties must be returned.25 From the
contractor's point of view, the practical effect of compliance is a delay
of three days before the job can be safely begun. Although he can
waive his own right to a mechanic's lien 28 in an attempt to avoid the
three-day rescission threat,27 the contractor usually cannot speak for
(1940). More recently, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Gardner & North Roofing &
Siding Corp, v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 858, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1972), took a similar
approach in liberally interpreting the same Federal Reserve System regulation challenged
in Freed. See notes 21-23 infra and accompanying text,
This "economic reality" approach has found widespread applicability in the area of
the interpretation of securities acts. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075
(7th Cir. 1972); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972); Kemmerer
v. Werner, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1967).
21464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22 Id. at 842.
23 Id.
24 Congressman Cahill observed that "most fraudulent mortgage schemes are consum-
mated in an atmosphere of hurry, rush, and fast talking." Remarks of Representative
Cahill, supra note 15, at 1611. As a result of the three-day rescission period, "homeowners
will be able to study and investigate the contemplated seriousness of the obligations which
they are able to undertake in the privacy and unhurried atmosphere of their own home."
Id. See The Right of Rescission, supra note 8, at 250.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. 1972).
26See, e.g., Cummings v. Broadway - 94th St. Realty Corp., 253 N.Y. 407, 155 N.E.
832 (1922).
27 The Federal Reserve Board has announced that a waiver of all lien rights will
eliminate security interests from the transaction, making it nonrescindable. See Federal
Reserve Board Public Position Letter No. 135 (Oct. 9, 1969), reprinted in R. Cs.orz, TRUTH-
IN-LENDING MANuAL A47 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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his subcontractors and materialmen. They must expressly waive their
lien rights before all security interests will be extinguished.28
Future controversy over congressional intent and the legitimacy
of the Board's implementing regulation will be purely academic if
pending legislation is adopted. Following the district court's adverse
ruling in Freed, the Federal Reserve Board requested an amendment
to section 125(a) which would broaden the language to encompass
statutory liens.29 The amending bill,30 unanimously approved by the
Senate,31 will clarify the Board's authority by including in the statute
present and future security interests "arising by operation of law."3 2
If the bill becomes law, courts such as the Second Circuit will be re-
lieved of the task of compensating for the under-inclusive language
of the original statute. The Board's regulation will more clearly con-
stitute "a clarification, and not an improper extension of the statute."3
28 A subcontractor may, by express agreement with a general contractor, waive his
right to a lien. See Mintzes Contracting Co. v. Country Wood Homes Corp., 202 N.Y.S.2d
359 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1960). However, the general contractor, although he may
waive his own rights, may not unilaterally waive the lien rights of subcontractors. See
C.M. Heist Ohio Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 201, 246 N.Y.S.2d 15 (4th
Dep't 1964). This approach is similar to the requirements contained in the New York Lien
Law, which include the existence of an express waiver agreement, in writing, and signed
either by the waiving party or his agent. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 34 (McKinney 1966).
29 See Letter from J.L. Robertson, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, to
Senator Proxmire, Feb. 28, 1972, in 4 CCH CONSUMER CmRErr GUIDE 30,811, at 66,354-56
(1973).
30 S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1973).
31 119 CONG. REc. 14,428 (daily ed. July 23, 1973). The bill has been referred to the
House Committee on Banking and Currency. 119 CONG. REG. 6588 (daily ed. July 24, 1973).
82 S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1973). See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TRrT IN LENDING AMENDMENTS, S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1973).
83 N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1973).
